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Quality Restrictions as Barriers to
Trade: The Case of European Community
Regulations  on the Use  of Hormones
E. Wesley  F. Peterson, Mechel  Paggi,  and Guy Henry
Sanitary regulations, product  definitions, grades, production or processing regulations,
and other qualitative standards  are generally applied to both domestic production and
imported goods. These  quality restrictions can be seen as trade barriers,  although it is
often difficult to determine whether a given restriction is based on legitimate health or
safety concerns or is simply an  alternative device  for protecting  producers. The
purpose of this paper is to evaluate the welfare effects  of a recent quality regulation,
the European Community  ban on the use of hormones in livestock production. A
conceptual  framework is developed to analyze the effects of the ban on the market for
edible offals.  The results indicate that Community  prices for edible offals will increase
34% to 45%, while the world price will fall by at least 35%.
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Traditional barriers  to trade implemented by
importing  countries  include  tariffs,  import
quotas,  and voluntary  export restraints.  The
different  consequences  and welfare  effects  of
these  forms  of protection  have  been  docu-
mented in the literature  (see, for example,  Al-
len, Dodge, and Schmitz; Kreinin; Blyth; Caves
and Jones). All three have the effect of raising
prices  in the  importing  country  but differ  in
the way in which the revenue from the market
intervention is distributed.  Typically, the rev-
enue from  a tariff is collected  by the govern-
ment of the importing country, while the rents
generated by an import quota accrue to those
who receive  licenses to import. In the case of
an import quota, the government  can capture
the rents if the licenses are sold or auctioned.
Voluntary export restraints also generate quota
rents,  but these  rents  are retained  in the  ex-
porting country  through  the  sale,  auction,  or
grant  of the right to export.
Another  type  of trade barrier is  the use  of
qualitative  standards  to prevent  the entry  of
certain kinds of goods.  Examples  of this type
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of trade  barrier  include  sanitary  regulations
preventing imports  of livestock from  regions
where  certain  diseases  (hoof and mouth  dis-
ease, African swine fever) have not been erad-
icated, product definitions specifying a narrow
range of ingredients allowed in processed food
(German  beer,  French  and  Italian  pasta),
grades, production or processing standards, and
many more. Qualitative trade restrictions dif-
fer from the more conventional trade barriers
in several  respects.  First,  they do  not neces-
sarily  affect the exports  of all suppliers.  Pro-
ducers in countries with similar standards or
those capable  of modifying their products to
comply with the regulations  do not perceive  a
barrier to their exports.  Producers  unable  to
comply with the standard,  on the other hand,
can no longer sell anything to the country im-
plementing  a  new  quality  requirement.  For
these  producers,  the  effect  is complete  exclu-
sion from the market in question.
Regulations  are  implemented  to  change  a
particular pattern of behavior.  The need for a
government  regulation  implies  that there  is
some economic advantage to the practices the
regulation  is  designed  to  alter.  As  a  conse-
quence,  it is likely that compliance  with the
regulation will raise the costs of production for
domestic  producers.  Thus,  the  importing
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country is likely to experience higher internal
prices. The effect  of the regulation on imports
depends on the response of domestic  produc-
ers and consumers and whether any exporting
countries  can  meet  the  standard.  In  the  ex-
treme,  imports  will  fall  to zero  if no  foreign
producers  are in compliance with the regula-
tion. In this case there are no quota rents gen-
erated by the quality restriction, although pro-
ducers  protected  by  the  regulation  may
experience  an increase in producer surplus.  If
no  foreign  producers  are  initially  in compli-
ance with the regulation,  the cost of changing
production practices to meet the new standard
will probably  offset any  potential quota rents
that might be gained from selling  in the pro-
tected market.  There  will  be quota  rents  for
foreign producers who  are already in compli-
ance  with the regulation or  who  can comply
with it costlessly.
It should also be noted that quality restric-
tions differ from conventional barriers to trade
in that they are often motivated by legitimate
concerns for public health and safety. If this is
the case, consumers  may be willing to pay the
higher price  in order to  obtain products that
meet the higher standards. However, there are
many  cases  where the  market  is able to take
account of quality variation without a govern-
ment regulation.  Discounts for high moisture
content in grain  are an  example  of price  ad-
justments  based on quality criteria.  If quality
differences are taken into account through nor-
mal market  processes,  regulations  may  serve
mainly to protect domestic producers and have
the effect  of limiting the  choices  available  to
consumers.
The purpose  of this paper  is to  analyze the
effects of a recently enacted quality restriction,
the  ban on the use  of hormones  in livestock
production  adopted  by  the  European  Com-
munity  (EC).  Meat  producers  in  the United
States and Australia have expressed their op-
position to the EC regulation, arguing that there
is little  scientific  evidence  of adverse  effects
from  consuming  meat  from  animals  treated
with growth promotants (Agra Europe, 17 Jan.
1986,  5 Dec.  1986; Feedstuffs, 17 Aug.  1987).
From this perspective the EC ban is a barrier
to trade rather than a measure to protect public
health. European consumer groups disagree and
have  insisted  on  the  implementation  of the
hormone  ban  as  scheduled  (Agra Europe,  5
Dec.  1986).  To  analyze  the economic  effects
of this  regulation,  a  conceptual model  is de-
veloped and applied  to the  market for edible
offals. The first part of the paper contains back-
ground information on the hormone ban, live-
stock policy, and the edible offal market in the
EC.  In the second part,  a model of the  edible
offal  market  is estimated  and used  to  assess
the  welfare  implication of the hormone  ban.
The  implications  of these results  and limita-
tions of the analysis are discussed in the con-
cluding section.
The EC Hormone Ban and the Market for
Edible Offals
Hormones are widely used to promote growth
in livestock. The major benefits of these agents
are improved feed conversion and faster, more
uniform,  growth  rates.  In  addition,  certain
breeds will produce leaner meat when treated
with  hormones  (Byers).  Thus,  reduced  costs
because of  more efficient feed use and less time
spent  in  the  fattening  stage  may  be  accom-
panied  by higher quality  meat.  These  factors
have  led  to the  widespread  adoption  of this
practice in livestock production throughout the
world. It is estimated that hormones are used
for beef cattle production in all regions of the
world,  although  the  proportion  of  animals
treated ranges from a low of about 15% in parts
of Latin America  to a high of around 95%  in
North America (McEvoy). Within the EC, nat-
ural  hormones  were  used  prior to  1985,  al-
though some  member states had banned their
use  (U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  1987).
Some observers in the EC fear that hormones
will continue to be used illicitly once the ban
is fully implemented  (Agra Europe, 26  June
1987).
Hormonal  agents  are usually  administered
to  livestock  through  implants  or  injections.
Under  some  circumstances,  hormonal  resi-
dues may  remain in the meat at  the time  of
slaughter. In 1981, the EC adopted a directive
prohibiting  the use  of substances  "having  a
thyrostatic action"  following the discovery of
traces of the hormone  DES (a known carcin-
ogen)  in baby  food in Italy  (European  Com-
munity). Concern for consumer safety was the
basis for this initial regulation.
On  31  December  1985  the  EC  adopted  a
second  directive  prohibiting  the  use  of sub-
stances  having "a thyrostatic,  estrogenic,  an-
drogenic  or gestagenic  action"  (European
Community).  This  directive,  which  will  be-
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come  effective  on  1 January  1988,  also  in-
cludes provisions  to prevent  the importation
of meat from  animals to which  any of these
hormonal substances  has  been administered.
The ban does not affect nonsexual hormones,
although there is consumer pressure to regulate
the use of nonsexual  substances as well (Agra
Europe, 5 Dec.  1986).
Since 1981, contradictory evidence has been
published  concerning  the  effects  of hormone
use on human health (Galbraith). A joint FAO/
WHO committee on food additives found that
three growth promotants  (estradiol-17B,  pro-
gesterone, and testosterone) can be used safely
in livestock production with no danger to hu-
man health (Feedstuffs, 17 Aug.  1987). Within
the  EC,  support  for the  hormone  ban is  not
unanimous.  The United Kingdom,  supported
by Denmark,  is hoping  to block  implemen-
tation of the  ban,  agreeing  that there is little
scientific evidence to support it (Agra Europe,
8 May  1987). European  and  some  U.S. con-
sumer groups, however, remain convinced that
the practice  should be stopped (Agra Europe,
5 Dec. 1986). Consumer groups in the EC have
been the  main  source  of pressure  for restric-
tions on the use of both natural and artificial
hormones  in  livestock  production.  The  EC
Commission,  however,  has  found  it  conve-
nient to  acquiesce to this  pressure.  The  hor-
mone ban is seen as a measure that may slow
the growth  in surplus  beef production  in the
EC, thus reducing subsidy expenditures  (Agra
Europe, 28 Aug.  1987).
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in-
cludes  a  wide  range  of provisions  to  protect
livestock markets in the EC. These include tar-
iffs, variable levies, export subsidies  and var-
ious subsidies paid directly to producers (Har-
ris,  Swinbank,  and  Wilkinson).  Livestock
production in the EC generally  exceeds  inter-
nal consumption,  and  the  EC is  a major ex-
porter of milk products,  beef,  and  veal.  The
only livestock product  for which  the EC  is a
significant  importer  is  sheepmeat,  although
specialty  products  such  as  high-quality  beef
and edible  offals  are  also  imported.  Support
prices  for major  livestock  products  are  gen-
erally higher than world prices so that EC ex-
ports must be subsidized.
It is  not  clear  how  the hormone  ban  will
affect production costs within the EC. The use
of both  natural  and  artificial  hormones  has
been illegal for several years in some EC coun-
tries.  Producers  in  countries  where  growth
promotants are not banned should experience
an increase in production costs when the new
legislation goes into effect.  Producers in coun-
tries where these products are already banned
will  not  see  a change  in  their costs.  On the
other hand,  observers  have noted  a thriving
black market in hormones, suggesting that this
production practice is common throughout the
EC (U.S. Department of Agriculture  1987). If
this is true and the new hormone ban  can be
implemented  in a way  that will prevent  hor-
mone  use,  production  costs may  actually in-
crease.  Whether production  costs increase  or
are  simply  prevented  from  falling,  the  main
impact  is  likely  to  be  on  the  EC  budget.  If
production  costs  and,  consequently,  internal
prices are higher than would otherwise be the
case,  export  subsidies  may have to be  larger
to maintain current export levels. On the other
hand,  EC  exporters  may be  able to  take  ad-
vantage of the fact that their meat is hormone-
free in promoting it on foreign markets. If they
are able to charge a premium for hormone-free
meat, the budgetary impact may be reduced.
Most of the  edible  offals  consumed in Eu-
rope are from cattle and hogs and include liv-
ers,  brains,  kidneys,  sweetbreads,  tripe,  and
tongues.  Consumption of edible offals  is par-
ticularly high in France and Ireland, where per
capita consumption is about twice the average
for  OECD  countries  (Meat  Balances  in
OECD Countries). Edible offals are a by-prod-
uct of somewhat less value than the meat for
which the animals are primarily produced. The
supply  of edible  offals  from  EC  livestock  is
largely determined as a fixed proportion of to-
tal meat supplies. Because of  the relatively high
levels  of per capita consumption,  EC produc-
tion of edible offals  accounts for only 80% to
90% of total consumption. In France, over half
of the  edible  offals  consumed  are  imported,
and edible  offals  make up  about  15%  of the
meat consumed annually  (Ross).
On  the  average,  the  EC  imports  about
200,000 metric tons of edible offals each year.
The United States is  a major  source of these
imports. In 1986,  about 90,000 metric tons of
edible offals worth $107  million were exported
to the  EC  by  the  United  States  (U.S.  Meat
Export  Federation  1987).  Argentina,  Brazil,
Australia, and New Zealand also export edible
offals to the EC and other countries  (see table
1). As noted earlier,  EC livestock markets are
protected  by a  variety  of trade  barriers  and
subsidies. In the case of edible offals, however,
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Figure 1.  World market for  edible offals
the only trade barrier is a customs duty (U.S.
Department of Agriculture  1981). Unlike oth-
er  agricultural  products  in the EC,  therefore,
variations  in the world  price  of edible  offals
are transmitted  to the EC market.  The recent
EC legislation  on hormone  use constitutes  an
additional barrier to entry. This measure may
have  a  significant  impact  on the edible  offal
market.
mand  in the world  market  is the sum  of the
excess demand schedules for the EC and other
importing  countries.  To keep the graph fairly
simple,  the intercepts  for the  two  excess  de-
mand schedules are assumed to coincide.
The introduction of the hormone ban by the
EC  means  that  imports of hormone  treated
offals will cease. It is assumed that all produc-
Conceptual  Model
A simple model of  the world market for edible
offals is illustrated in figure 1. Domestic supply
and  demand  in exporting  nations  are  shown
in panel a. The importing countries are divided
into the EC (panel d) and other importing na-
tions (panel c).  Domestic supplies in all three
regions  are assumed to be perfectly  inelastic.
The rationale for this assumption is that edible
offals  are a by-product  of meat production.  It
is  thus  likely that  supplies  marketed  depend
more on conditions  in meat markets than on
edible offal prices. On the other hand, increases
in  offal  prices  may lead to greater  supplies if
livestock processors find it profitable to market
offals that currently  are  simply  thrown  away
or used in pet  foods.  However,  for purposes
of illustration, assuming perfectly inelastic do-
mestic supplies is reasonable.
Panel b of  figure  1  represents the world mar-
ket. Excess  supply  is derived  in the conven-
tional  manner  by  measuring  the  horizontal
distance  between  the  supply  and  demand
schedules in the exporting nations.  Excess de-
Table  1.  World
Metric Tons
Trade  in  Edible  Offals  in
Country  1981  1983  1985
Imports
EC total  205,000  202,000  181,000
From: U.S.  96,968  101,013  86,675
Canada  12,165  10,651
Oceania  20,058  20,068
Other  75,809  70,268
Japan  64,431  65,035  82,090
Mexico  68,510  39,238  104,530
Other  287,179  335,239  359,356
Total  625,120  641,512  726,976
Exports
U.S. total  210,117  219,195  247,696
To: EC  96,968  101,013  86,675
Japan  35,260  35,855  40,070
Egypt  9,170  19,009  29,378
Mexico  20,108  21,354  60,805
Other  48,611  41,964  30,768
Canada  73,567  69,355  76,488
Oceania  94,544  101,502  84,400
Latin America  80,216  60,449  66,475
Other  245,851  255,059  279,654
Total  704,295  705,560  754,673
Source:  FAO, Eurostat, USDA/ERS.
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ers in exporting  countries  use hormones  and
that they will not immediately  cease this prac-
tice.  In this situation,  EC  imports will fall to
zero and the internal price will rise to Pe.  Prior
to the hormone  ban  the price  in the  EC was
equal to the world price plus the customs duty.
The duty is not shown in figure  1, but adding
it to the EC panel would not affect the analysis
presented  here.  The increase  in the  EC price
following  the  hormone  ban  raises  producer
surplus by the area labeled A.  Consumer  sur-
plus falls by areas  A  plus B,  so there is a net
welfare loss in the EC equal to area B.
In  the  world  market,  the  excess  demand
schedule shifts from ED, to ED, where EDr is
excess  demand  in importing  countries  other
than the  EC.  EDt,  of course,  is  the  sum  of
excess demand in the EC and EDr. This fall in
excess demand results in a lowering of  the world
price  for edible  offals.  Consumers  in the  ex-
porting countries  as  well  as those  in non-EC
importing nations benefit from the lower prices,
while producers in both regions are hurt. Note
that the  fall  in total world  trade  is less  than
the amount of EC imports that are lost because
the lower world price will lead to some increase
in imports by non-EC importing countries.
Empirical Results
The relationships  described  above  were  esti-
mated econometrically  using annual  data for
the period 1972 to 1984. The data include the
quantities produced,  consumed and imported
in nine EC countries including the six original
members and three  countries,  Denmark,  Ire-
land and the United Kingdom, that joined in
1972.  Because  these  last  three  countries  did
not officially  enter the EC until January  1973,
observations  for  1972  for the three countries
were added to those  of the six original mem-
bers. Greece is not included in the analysis. In
addition  to the  EC data, world  excess supply
and demand data and prices are used. An  es-
timate of the world price was obtained by di-
viding the dollar  value  of world trade  by the
quantities  traded  (U.S. Meat  Export Federa-
tion  1986).  It would have been  preferable  to
use  actual prices,  but no  such  price  series  is
available.  The EC price was obtained  using a
dollar/European  Currency  Unit  (ECU)  ex-
change rate adjusted for inflation according to
the  procedure  described  by  Longmire  and
Morey.  The real  ECU  price  was  adjusted to
reflect  the  customs  duty.  The  customs  duty
applied to most edible offals was 9% until 1980
when  it  was  cut to  4%  (U.S. Department  of
Agriculture  1981).  Thus, the ECU  price  was
multiplied by 1.09 for the period 1972 to 1979
and by  1.04 for the period  1980 to  1984. The
income  variable  used  was  compiled  from
OECD  national  accounts  series for  real  con-
sumer expenditures  (National  Accounts, Main
Aggregate,  1960-1984). All  series  on  quan-
tities  produced,  consumed  and  traded  were
drawn from Foreign Agriculture  Service (U.S.
Department of Agriculture,  various  issues) or
FAO  publications.
The  simplest  approach  to  estimating  the
consequences of the hormone ban is to assume
that supplies are predetermined so that the sys-
tem can be treated recursively. If the quantities
supplied are perfectly  inelastic,  depending  on
the number  of animals  slaughtered  for meat,
it is reasonable to assume that supplies of edi-
ble offals  are predetermined.  In this recursive
system, price-dependent demand equations can
be estimated by ordinary least squares (Tomek
and Robinson).  Imports are treated as a resid-
ual  computed  as  the  difference  between  the
quantities  demanded  and  supplied.  This  ap-
proach allows  direct estimation  of price  flex-
ibilities,  which  can be used to determine  the
change  in EC prices  following the implemen-
tation of the hormone ban.1
The  estimated  demand  relationship  is  re-
ported  below.  Throughout the paper,  the fig-
ures  in parentheses  below  the equations  are
standard errors.  Real EC prices  are modeled
as  a function  of per capita  consumption  and
real income (as measured by per capita  GDP
in  the  EC).  The  demand  equation  was  also
estimated with  several  variables  to represent
substitutes in demand. These additional vari-
ables added little to the explanatory power of
the equation and were dropped.




where R2 = .55,  first-order rho = .539, CONS
is per capita consumption of edible offals, and
A  supply equation  was  estimated  in an  attempt  to test  the
hypothesis that supply is  perfectly inelastic. The estimated  equa-
tion showed  a negative  price  response,  suggesting that price  de-
pends on the quantity supplied  rather than the reverse. The  elas-
ticity estimated from this equation was significantly different from
zero statistically but quite small (-.06).  These results suggest that
the assumption that supply is predetermined  is not unreasonable.
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RLY is real per capita GDP. The original  es-
timation showed evidence of serial correlation
so  the  equation  was  reestimated  using  the
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.  Although the ad-
justed R2 is fairly low, the coefficients  for both
explanatory variables are significant and of the
expected sign. The price flexibility derived from
equation  (1) is  -3.21.  Alternative  specifica-
tions  generally  yielded  flexibilities  between
-2.80 and -3.60.
These  results  can  be  used  to compute  the
welfare implications of the hormone ban with-
in the EC. The first step in these computations
is to use the price flexibility  to determine the
EC price when imports  are eliminated  (Pec in
fig.  1).  The  change  in producer  surplus  (area
A) is simply the product of EC offal production
and  the  change  in  price.  To  determine  the
change  in  consumer  surplus,  the  area  of the
small triangle  (area B) must be added to area
A. Area  B, which  is also the net welfare loss,
is  computed  by  multiplying  the  change  in
quantity  (that is, what the EC previously im-
ported)  by the  change  in  price  and  dividing
this  amount by two. In addition  to the  price
flexibility, it is necessary to know EC produc-
tion of edible offals (ECOFF),  EC imports (the
difference  between  CONS and ECOFF), and
the initial price (ECUPR). To provide a range
in  the  estimates,  flexibilities  of -2.80  and
-3.60 were used in addition to the flexibility
derived from equation (1)(-3.21).  The quan-
tity and price  variables are the average levels
for the period  1980-84. The EC price is in real
ECUs  with the customs  duty  removed.  The
welfare  effects  in the  EC  are  summarized  in
table 2.
The  elimination  of imports of edible offals
following  the hormone  ban  would  lead  to  a
decline in consumption of about 12%. Market
prices in the EC are estimated  to increase be-
tween 34% and 45%. The changes lead to rel-
atively  large  gains  in  producer  surplus  and
losses in consumer  surplus.  As would  be ex-
pected, the net welfare loss is fairly small com-
pared to the gains realized by producers.  The
predicted  changes  are  quite  large  relative  to
historical  price  variation.  The largest  change
in real EC prices  observed  during  the period
upon  which  this  analysis  is based  was  25%.
Although cross-price effects were not found to
be significant,  it is quite possible that changes
of the magnitude indicated  above would lead
to some  substitution that would  mitigate  the
impact on prices.  In addition, if producers in
some countries are in compliance with the reg-
Table 2.  Welfare  Effects of Hormone Ban in
EC in Millions  of 1980 ECU
Flexibility
Measure  -2.80  -3.21  -3.60
Change in producer
surplus (P)  719.7  825.0  925.3
Change in consumer
surplus (C)  -769.6  -882.3  -989.6
Net welfare  change
in EC (P + C)  -49.9  -57.3  -64.3
ulation on hormones, imports by the EC need
not fall to zero. This would also reduce the size
of the welfare changes.  The estimates  shown
in table  1 thus should be seen as upper limits.
The actual changes resulting from the hormone
ban  may  be  less  pronounced.  On the  other
hand, Ginzel and Krissoff obtained similar re-
sults (an increase of 49% in the EC offal price)
in a separate  analysis.
The next step is to analyze the impact of the
EC legislation on the world market. Excess de-
mand equations for the EC and the rest of the
world  and an  excess  supply equation  for  ex-
porting nations  were  specified  and estimated
with  two-  and three-stage  least  squares.  The
price coefficients in the demand equations were
not significantly different from zero. A system
including a single excess demand equation was
also estimated with similar results. The initial
specifications  included  world  meat  produc-
tion, real-world  price, and a time trend as ex-
planatory  variables  for  world  excess  supply.
Real-world  price,  real-world  GDP,  and  per
capita poultry consumption (a substitute) were
included as explanatory variables for world ex-
cess demand. In the initial system, the coeffi-
cient  of world  meat production  was  not  sig-
nificantly  different  from  zero  in  the  excess
supply equation,  and  only real-world  income
(GDP) was  significant  in the  excess  demand
equation.  In addition, the linear system  orig-
inally specified  was inappropriate  for analyz-
ing the impact  of the  EC ban. About 30%  of
the total quantity of edible offals traded go to
the EC. Removal of such a large quantity from
a linear  system would give unreliable  predic-
tions. Nevertheless,  the results of these initial
estimates  did  provide some insights.  For ex-
ample, the price coefficient in the world excess
supply  equation  was  quite  robust,  changing
only slightly under different specifications and
estimation techniques. The excess supply elas-
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ticity from the linear equations was estimated
to be .17.
To overcome  the problem  of linearity,  the
system was estimated in logarithms. The log-
arithmic system showed evidence of serial cor-
relation so it was reestimated using two-stage
least  squares  corrected  for  first-order  serial
correlation  (Cochrane-Orcutt  technique).
World meat production was dropped from the
system, and the real-world price is not includ-
ed  in the  demand  equation.  The  results  are
shown in equations  (2) and (3).
(2)  log WSOFF= 10.381  +  .221  log RWP
(.734)  (.077)
+  .46 log  T
(.054)
R2 =  .97  rho =  .463,
(3)  log  WDOFF= -1.627  +  1.583 log  WGDP
(4.506)  (.579)
+  .557  log PCP
(.472)
R2 = .95  rho =  .246,
where WSOFF is world excess supply of edible
offals,  WDOFF  is total excess demand for edi-
ble offals,  RWP is  real-world  price  (deflated
by U.S. GNP deflator),  Tis time trend,  WGDP
is real GDP of OECD  countries,  and PCP is
world per capita poultry consumption.
These results indicate that the excess supply
elasticity is about .2, only slightly different from
the  estimate  derived  from the linear  system.
The  income  elasticity  of demand  appears  to
be  relatively  large.2 The  signs  for  all  of the
parameters  except  that  of poultry  consump-
tion are as  expected.  However,  the coefficient
for the  poultry  consumption  variable  is  not
significantly different from zero.  The estimat-
ed  supply  elasticity  and  income  elasticity  of
demand were quite robust, varying only slight-
ly in alternative specifications.  On the basis of
these results,  an estimate of the impact of the
EC hormone ban can be obtained by subtract-
ing the  1980  to  1984  average  volume  of EC
imports from the quantity traded on the world
market. To represent the movement along the
excess  supply curve,  the  left-hand  side of the
2 It should be noted that the estimated income elasticity is related
to excess demand. If  all countries have the same underlying income
elasticity of demand, an estimate of domestic elasticities  is given
by multiplying the estimated elasticity by the share of trade in total
consumption.  For the  EC,  for  example,  imports of edible  offals
make up about  12% of total consumption and the implied income
elasticity is  about .19.
excess  supply  equation  is  reduced  by  the
amount of EC imports and solved for the real-
world  price, holding the other variables  con-
stant. Because of the large proportion of world
trade  accounted  for by EC imports,  the  esti-
mated  fall  in  price  is  quite  large.  Based  on
equation (2), it is estimated that the real-world
price would fall about 78% following the with-
drawal  of the EC from the market.
The fall in world price predicted above ap-
pears somewhat extreme. Because no response
by  importers  to changes  in world  price  was
found, the system  described by equations  (2)
and (3) does not allow the adjustments by the
importers  that  would  be  expected  following
such a large change. Historically, world edible
offal trade ranged from about 400,000 metric
tons  to over 700,000  metric tons  after  1980.
In  recent  years  the  EC has  purchased  about
200,000  metric  tons  or  29%  of the  quantity
traded.  A fall  in the volume traded  to about
500,000  metric  tons  is  a very  large  change,
although that  quantity  is still within the his-
torical range. The largest change in the volume
of trade from one year to the next observed in
the historical data was  16%, although the av-
erage volume of trade  in the early  1980s was
63%  greater  than  the  average  volume  from
1972 to  1975.
Another problem with  the linear and loga-
rithmic  systems  estimated  stems  from  the
probable measurement errors in the price vari-
able. As Orcutt has shown, observation errors
and shifts in the demand  surface  bias the  es-
timated price elasticities in international trade
toward  zero.  As  an  alternative  approach,  a
price-dependent equation for the world market
was estimated.  Price-dependent  equations in-
cluding the volume of world edible offal trade,
per capita  GDP for OECD  countries,  a time
trend, and per capita world poultry consump-
tion  as  explanatory  variables  were  estimated
according  to  three  specifications.  The  first
specification was a simple linear equation. The
estimated equation was statistically sound, with
all coefficients  significantly different from zero
at  a  level  of confidence  of 95%.  The  linear
equation  led  to  predictions  similar  to  those
obtained from equation (2), indicating that the
EC ban would lead to a 66% fall in world price.
The other two specifications were nonlinear.
A  time-varying  parameter  model  was  esti-
mated. The coefficients in this model were sta-
tistically significant,  but the predictions of ac-
tual prices based on the model parameters and
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pendent variables were
final specification  was
)del shown as equation







.81  rho= .588
R2 =  .81  rho =  .588,
where  VT  is  volume  traded  (=WSOFF =
WDOFF). The results  shown  in equation  (4)
have been  corrected for first-order serial cor-
relation. All of the coefficients  are significantly
different from zero at a level  of confidence of
92%  or  better.  As in the  previous  estimates,
the sign of the coefficient for per capita poultry
consumption is positive. The coefficient for the
volume-traded  variable  suggests  that  a  1%
change in the quantity traded will lead to about
a  1.3%  change  in  the real-world  price.  This
flexibility  implies a larger  excess supply  elas-
ticity  than  was found in the direct  estimates
of the excess supply and excess demand sched-
ules. A larger supply response is consistent with
Orcutt's  results,  indicating  that  direct  esti-
mates of price elasticities in international trade
may be  biased  toward  zero  (Orcutt).  On  the
basis of equation (4), a reduction in world trade
equivalent  to the  volume  of EC imports  will
lead to a fall in real-world price of about  35%.
Of the three specifications for the price-de-
pendent equation, the constant elasticity form
appears  to be  the  most  reasonable.  A linear
equation  is likely to overestimate  the impact
of  changes in world trade, while the time-vary-
ing  parameter  model  could  not be validated
using  historical  data.  The  estimate  of a  35%
fall in world price  is still high relative  to the
results presented by Ginzel and Krissoff,  who
found that withdrawal of  the EC from the world
market  for  edible  offals  would  cause  a  14%
decline  in  the  world  price.  On  the  basis  of
equation  (4),  the value  of world  edible  offal
trade would fall from a 1980  to 1984 average
of over one billion dollars to about $504 mil-
lion. This represents a decline of 54%.  Using
the figure reported by Ginzel and Krissoff still
leads to a predicted  fall in the value of world
trade in edible offals of almost 39%. According
to these results, the elimination of EC imports
would have a substantial impact on the world
market for edible offals.
It should be emphasized  that the estimates
presented  in  this  paper  represent  an  upper
bound.  The  procedure  used  to  obtain  them
does not allow the effects  of demand  changes
in other importing countries to be taken into
account.  As shown in figure 1, the fall in world
price  should  be  mitigated  by  an  increase  in
imports  by countries  outside the  EC.  On  the
other hand, the evidence from the econometric
analysis  suggests  that excess  demand  may be
quite unresponsive  to price  changes. If this is
the  case,  there  would  be  little  to  soften  the
impact of the EC policy change on world prices.
The  results  also  depend  critically  on  the  as-
sumption  that  the  EC  ceases  all  imports.  If
some  countries  are  able to meet  the new  EC
requirements  the  fall  in  EC  imports  may be
less severe and the impact on world price less
pronounced.
Conclusions
Quality restrictions on traded goods may have
significant  impacts  on  both  consumers  and
producers.  Because they often have the  effect
of preventing  any imports  from  entering  the
country,  their effect may be larger than more
conventional  barriers  to  trade.  In this paper
we have examined the implications  for edible
offal markets of recent EC legislation banning
the use  of hormones  in livestock production.
Assuming  that this restriction  causes  the  EC
to cease  importing  edible  offals  (i.e.,  that no
exporting countries are in compliance with the
EC regulation), the effect  on prices is likely to
be substantial. The results of the analysis pre-
sented here  indicate  that  EC  prices  will  in-
crease between 34% and 45%, while the world
price  will  fall  by  at least  35%.  As  expected,
within  the  EC  the  net welfare  loss  resulting
from  the regulation  is  relatively  small  com-
pared to the increase in producer surplus. The
estimates  presented  in  this  paper  constitute
upper limits. The impact of the EC legislation
would be less severe if EC imports do not fall
to zero (i.e., if some exporters can comply with
the regulation)  or if other  importing nations
respond to the lower world price by increasing
their purchases of edible  offals.
Nevertheless, the effect of the hormone ban
on both EC and world prices may be substan-
tial. For the EC, higher prices for edible offals
actual data for the inde]
highly inaccurate.  The
a constant  elasticity mc
(4).
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may not have  a direct impact  on exports  be-
cause the  EC currently  does not export these
products. If compliance with the hormone ban
raises costs of livestock production or prevents
them from  declining,  internal  prices  may be
higher than would otherwise be the case. This
could put pressure on the EC budget since ex-
port subsidies may increase. On the other hand,
it is  conceivable that  EC exporters  would  be
able  to  charge  a premium  for hormone-free
beef on the world  market offsetting the need
for increased subsidies.  The problem with this
is that  a black  market for hormones  already
exists,  and it is not clear that the EC will ac-
tually be able to  enforce the ban internally. If
properly  administered,  artificial  and  natural
growth promotants  are difficult to detect.
From the point of view of the United States,
the EC ban could have a very significant effect
on sales of edible offals and high quality beef.
The EC  directive  would not only  reduce the
volume of U.S. sales but would also lead to a
lower world price.  In  1986, the value of U.S.
edible  offal  exports  was  about  $337  million,
and 32% of these exports were shipped to the
EC.  Assuming  a  35%  fall in world  price  and
no  market for  the  edible  offal  exports previ-
ously sold to the EC, the value of U.S. exports
would have fallen 56%, to about $148 million.
The U.S. beef industry estimates, however, that
compliance  with the EC hormone ban would
result in the loss of $314  million of domestic
production  (U.S.  Meat  Export Federation
1987).  It  does  not appear  that  it  would  be
worthwhile to attempt to comply with the EC
legislation in an effort to save the edible  offal
market.
However,  some individual producers might
find it profitable  to produce high-quality  beef
and  edible  offals  without hormones  in order
to take advantage of the higher EC prices. At
the moment  it  is  not clear  how the  EC  will
control  for the  presence  of hormones  in im-
ported meat. Because of the cost and difficulty
of detecting  growth promotants,  the EC may
simply ban imports from countries where these
products are still used regardless of whether a
particular  producer  actually  administered
them. Alternatively,  the EC could permit im-
ports certified to be hormone free but establish
a  system  of inspection  and  certification  so
cumbersome that it would not be profitable to
export low-valued products such as edible  of-
fals. If the certification procedure  is adminis-
tratively burdensome, the result could well be
that the EC ceases importation of edible offals
entirely.  If this is the  case, the estimates pre-
sented  in this paper  are not at all  unrealistic.
A final issue for the United States concerns the
possibility  that  other  countries  might  adopt
similar legislation.  If Japan were to implement
a hormone ban, for example,  it could have a
significant effect  on U.S. exports of high qual-
ity beef.
There are many existing and potential qual-
ity restrictions  in international  trade. Further
analysis of  the effects of  these restrictions would
be useful in defining policies to deal with them.
The most difficult problem in the study of these
regulations  is  to discover methods  to distin-
guish restrictions  that are based on legitimate
health or  other concerns  from those  that are
primarily  designed  as  an alternative  protec-
tionist device in a world where conventional
trade barriers are being eliminated.
Consider the  case in the  EC. Artificial hor-
mone  additives have been banned  in several
countries  for many  years. However,  the  sub-
stantial  cost-savings  due  to  the  use  of hor-
mones have provided an incentive for the il-
legal  use  of these  products.  Because  farmers
frequently  are  not trained  in the administra-
tion of hormones, there have been cases where
unsafe levels  of hormonal residues have been
found in meat. In this situation, consumer per-
ceptions  are  that  any  use  of hormones  is  a
threat to human health, and it is the consumer
groups  that  have  pressed  for  the ban  rather
than  producer  groups  seeking  protectionist
rents.  In contrast,  fewer  problems with these
substances  have  been  encountered  in  the
United  States, where hormones  are adminis-
tered legally (in the form of  ear implants rather
than injections  as in the case in EC) by indi-
viduals who are reasonably well-trained in their
use.  Convincing  European  consumers  that
hormones can be administered  safely may be
difficult. This is an example of regulatory pol-
itics where the actions of the various  interest
groups are based on incomplete  information.
Because  nations  come  increasingly  into  con-
tact through international trade, conflicts such
as the one over the EC hormone ban may occur
more  frequently.  The  political  economy  of
quality regulations in international trade is an
area where much further research  is needed.
[Received June 1987; final revision
received March 1988.]
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